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Abstract: Influential thinkers such as Young, Sugden, Binmore, and Skyrms have 
developed game-theoretic accounts of the emergence, persistence and evolu-
tion of social contracts. Social contracts are sets of commonly understood rules 
that govern cooperative social interaction within societies. These naturalistic 
accounts provide us with valuable and important insights into the foundations 
of human societies. However, current naturalistic theories focus mainly on how 
social contracts solve coordination problems in which the interests of the indi-
vidual participants are (relatively) aligned, not competition problems in which 
individual interests compete with group interests (and in which there are no 
group beneficial Nash equilibrium available). In response, I set out to build on 
those theories and provide a (more) comprehensive naturalistic account of the 
emergence, persistence and evolution of social contracts. My central claim is that 
social contracts have culturally evolved to solve cooperation problems, which 
include both coordination and competition problems. I argue that solutions to 
coordination problems (which I spell out) emerge from “within-group” dynam-
ics, while solutions to competition problems (which I also spell out) result largely 
from “between-group” dynamics.
Keywords: Social contracts; Game theory; Cultural evolution; Coordination 
 problems; Competition problems; Within-group dynamics; Between-group 
dynamics; Cultural group selection.
1   Introduction
In important and influential work, Young (1998), Sugden (2005), Binmore (1994, 
1998, 2005, 2007) and Skyrms (1996, 2004) have developed naturalistic accounts 
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2      Michael Vlerick
of the emergence, persistence and evolution of social contracts. Social contracts 
are sets of commonly understood rules that govern cooperative social interac-
tion within societies. These rules range from commonly known but implicit rules 
of interaction (such as the obligation to share meat after a successful hunt in 
hunter-gatherer societies) to explicit laws. Social contracts are the backbones of 
societies: they underlie social interaction within the group and orchestrate the 
unrivaled large-scale and flexible forms of cooperation humans engage in.
The chosen tool to analyze the emergence and cultural evolution of social 
contracts or social structure is evolutionary game theory (see also Gintis 2009). 
Game theory enables us to model the outcome of strategic interaction both in 
human and non-human groups (Maynard-Smith and Price 1973). It is, as Gintis 
(2009) points out, an indispensable tool in the toolbox of the social scientist. 
This evolutionary approach, I believe, is valuable and important. It seeks to 
provide a scientific understanding of the foundations of human societies (see 
also Vlerick 2016).
Drawing from David Lewis’ (1969) seminal work “Convention”, Young, 
Sugden, Binmore and Skyrms argue that social contracts emerge spontaneously 
out of the social interaction within the group and can only persist in Nash equi-
libria of what Binmore (1994, 2005, 2007) calls the “game(s) of life” we play with 
each other. This is a key insight and the central point of naturalistic theories of 
social contracts. In such equilibria, everybody has a best response to what every-
body else is doing.
While current game-theoretic accounts of social contracts have much merit, 
they focus primarily on how evolutionary dynamics drive the interaction towards 
group beneficial equilibria available in the various games of life being played 
within the group. This leaves us with a somewhat incomplete account of what 
social contracts do. It provides an account of how social contracts solve coordina-
tion problems in which the interests of the individual participants are (relatively) 
aligned, not competition problems1 in which individual interests compete with 
group interests (and in which there is therefore no group beneficial Nash equi-
librium available).
Tellingly, Binmore defines a social contract as a “self-policing agreement 
between members of society to coordinate on a particular equilibrium in the game 
of life” (1994, p. 35, my italics) and as “sets of common understandings that allow 
1 What I call a “competition problem” is often referred to as “the problem of cooperation” (or 
“the hard problem of cooperation”) or the “free-rider problem” in the literature (e.g. Eriksson and 
Strimling 2012). I prefer to use the general term “cooperation problem” to include both coordina-
tion problems and free-rider or competition problems, since both kinds of problems need to be 
solved in order to cooperate successfully, not merely the latter kind.
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the citizens of a society to coordinate their efforts” (2005, p. 3, my italics). In a 
similar vein, Skyrms (2004, p. vii) argues that prisoner’s dilemma problems – the 
archetypical competition problems – were not typically encountered in human 
(evolutionary) history. It is the “stag hunt” – which is a coordination problem – 
he claims, that is “the key to the evolution of cooperation, collective action, and 
social structure”.
The aim of this paper is to build on those important naturalistic theories 
and provide a (more) comprehensive naturalistic account of the emergence and 
evolution of social contracts by including how social contracts solve competi-
tion problems and why these solutions emerged in human societies. My central 
claim, spelled out in Section 2, is that social contracts have culturally evolved 
to solve cooperation problems. Cooperation problems include both coordina-
tion problems – which, as pointed out, have been getting most of the attention 
– and competition problems. In Sections 3 and 4, using game-theoretic models 
and drawing from various strands of empirical research, I will outline how social 
contracts solve coordination problems and how they solve competition problems. 
Both kinds of problems, as I will show, are solved in a different way.
Finally, in Section 5, I will outline the underlying cultural dynamics that 
drive the emergence and evolution of social contracts. Those are “within” and 
“between-group” dynamics. The former drive social contracts to stable points in 
the games of life – (Nash) equilibria – while the latter select efficient equilib-
ria. Between-group dynamics are the result of competition between groups. They 
have driven the cultural evolution of social contracts in societies directly and the 
genetic evolution of human (social) psychology indirectly through what Richer-
son and Boyd (1985, 2005) have called “gene-culture co-evolution”.
2   Cooperation Problems
2.1   What are Cooperation Problems?
Cooperation problems are problems that a group of individuals needs to  overcome 
in order to reap the benefits of mutual cooperation. They occur in positive sum 
games in which the sum of the payoff of the players increases when they cooper-
ate. What could stand in the way of cooperation (the cooperation problems) is 
the failure of individuals to coordinate their actions and/or the failure to prevent 
individuals from free-riding (not contributing to the cooperative effort). In the 
first case, we have a coordination problem. In the second case, a competition 
problem.
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Cooperation problems do not include “conflict problems” in which the 
interests of the individuals involved are diametrically opposed to one another. 
In such “zero sum games” one individual’s gain is balanced by another indi-
vidual’s loss (hence “zero sum”: the sum of the payoffs is zero). Consequently, 
cooperation can never emerge. Take the “matching pennies game” for example. 
In this game, two participants are asked to reveal a penny simultaneously. If 
the pennies match – i.e. both have heads or tails facing up – player 1 keeps 
both pennies. If they do not, player 2 keeps both pennies. In such a context, 
the players – provided that they are rational and act out of self-interest – will 
never cooperate (e.g. by coordinating their choices to yield matching or non-
matching pennies).
2.2   Coordination vs. Competition Problems
A coordination problem arises when there are different ways to produce a com-
monly desired outcome and the participants need to agree on how to proceed. 
The typical example of a pure coordination problem is the “driving game”. 
There are two optimal ways in which traffic can be regulated: either every-
body drives on the left of the road or everybody drives on the right of the road. 
Drivers do not care either way (both solutions are equally optimal) but they all 
want to coordinate on one of those two solutions (i.e. all drive on the same side 
of the road).
A competition problem arises when the immediate interest of individuals 
within the group is pitted against (competes with) the interest of the group (or 
the compounded interest of all the individuals within the group). In these con-
texts, participants are better off on average and in total when all participants 
cooperate, but each individual participant is better off when he does not cooper-
ate (when he “defects” in game-theoretic parlance). Two famous “games” that 
illustrate competition problems are the “prisoner’s dilemma” and the “tragedy 
of the commons”.
The prisoner’s dilemma goes as follows. Two suspects of a crime are arrested. 
They are kept in different cells and interrogated separately. Each member has a 
choice to betray the other by testifying that the other committed the crime or to 
cooperate with the other by remaining silent.
 – If A and B both betray the other, they both serve 2 years in prison
 – If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve 3 years 
in prison (and vice versa)
 – If A and B both remain silent, both of them will only serve 1 year in prison
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This gives us the following payoff matrix:
Cooperate Betray
Cooperate 1, 1 3,0
Betray 0, 3 2, 2
− − −
− − −
  
  
The best outcome on average and in total for both players is the one in which 
they both cooperate (remain silent) and serve just 1 year in prison. However, each 
player always has an incentive to betray the other. If the other does not betray 
him, he goes free instead of serving 1 year in prison. If the other also betrays him, 
he serves 2 years in prison instead of three. When both players act rationally and 
out of self-interest, they will both betray each other. Mutual defection [−2, −2] is 
the Nash equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma – the outcome in which no player 
can improve his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy – but it is not the 
optimal outcome, which is mutual cooperation [−1, −1].
The same problem occurs in the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). 
Suppose there is a pasture that can sustain a hundred sheep. Ten shepherds use 
the pasture and each shepherd has ten sheep. Adding more sheep would cause 
the pasture to be overgrazed and ultimately turn into a wasteland. Nevertheless 
each shepherd will still benefit from adding another sheep. This generates a sub-
stantial increase in income (10% more wool) and only a relatively small cost (1% 
less grass for his sheep). Shepherds aiming to maximize their individual payoff 
will therefore increase their livestock beyond the capacity of the pasture leading 
to the demise of this common good. The problem is that the cost of adding another 
animal is shared by the entire group, while the benefit of adding another animal 
is reaped by each individual shepherd. As in the prisoner’s dilemma, individual 
interests clash with group interests. Everybody is better off if everybody cooper-
ates, but each individual is always better off by defecting (betraying in the pris-
oner’s dilemma and adding livestock in the tragedy of the commons).
2.3   Solving Cooperation Problems with Social Contracts
Real world examples of solutions to coordination and competition problems 
abound. Traffic rules, signs and lights are all successful solutions to coordinate 
traffic. Social conventions, such as the convention that the caller is to call back 
when a phone call is interrupted (avoiding the undesirable situations in which 
both call back at the same time or wait in vain for the other to call back), is an 
equally effective solution to a coordination problem (Lewis 1969, p. 5). Finally, 
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even language is a solution to a coordination problem (Lewis 1969). By implicitly 
agreeing to attach a certain meaning to certain utterances or sets of symbols, we 
are able to realize the commonly desired outcome of successful communication.2
Successful solutions to competition problems are equally prevalent in soci-
eties. Throughout human history, groups have imposed rules on how individu-
als may and may not use common goods or common-pool resources in order to 
prevent a tragedy of the commons (Ostrom 1990). Think of restrictions on the use 
of grazing pastures (e.g. no allowing grazing in certain periods of the year) in 
pastoral societies, rules to maintain water reserves in arid regions, and rules to 
keep city parks and neighborhood playgrounds clean. Today, climate change pre-
sents us with the threat of a tragedy of the commons on a global scale and people 
around the world are trying hard (albeit it with somewhat limited success so far) 
to prevent this by imposing worldwide rules on the emission of CO2 and other 
greenhouse gasses.
The same goes for prisoner’s dilemma situations. Sport federations regu-
late the use of performance enhancing substances. If they would not do so, 
athletes would be tied in an arm’s race to use substances to get an edge over 
their competitors. This would be costly for the athletes and could have a nega-
tive impact on their health. By regulating the use of substances and punish-
ing infractions, federations try to prevent that “the game” gravitates towards 
the Nash equilibrium of a prisoner’s dilemma in which everybody is worse 
off: a level playing field in which all athletes dope. Similarly, international 
treaties aimed at curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
try to prevent a situation in which countries have to build up their arsenal in 
response to other (possibly antagonistic) nations doing so. Again, the result of 
such an arm’s race would make all parties worse off: countries would have to 
bear important economic costs and – worse – increases the likelihood of being 
the victim of a “nuclear Armageddon”. Finally, enforcing property prevents 
individuals from adopting predatory strategies to acquire goods by ruse or by 
force, making society better off.3
2 Note that we also solve coordination problems on the fly. When doing so, we do not rely on 
pre-established rules or agreements. Think of the way people form a line and pass buckets with 
water to extinguish a fire, or send and fill in a doodle to determine a place and time for a meeting, 
or divide tasks on the spot when jointly cooking a meal that all will enjoy.
3 Technically this is a solution not to a prisoner’s dilemma but to another competition game 
namely a “hawk dove game” or a “chicken game” which has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which 
part of the population adopts the predatory strategy (the “hawk” strategy) and the other part the 
cooperative strategy (the “dove” strategy). See Vlerick (2016).
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All of these solutions to cooperation problems come from social contracts: 
sets of commonly recognized rules or norms in a group (a society) that govern 
certain domains of interaction. They enable people to coordinate their actions to 
achieve commonly desired outcomes (solving coordination problems) and protect 
the group interest from free-rider behavior (solving competition problems). In the 
next two subsections, I will outline in more detail how social contracts solve both 
kinds of cooperation problems.
3   Solving Coordination Problems
3.1   Signaling
Coordination problems are epistemic problems. They are typically solved by com-
munication. Since the interests of senders and receivers are aligned, successful 
cooperation depends on the successful transfer and interpretation of information. 
If senders and receivers communicate well, cooperation follows. Solving coordi-
nation problems is by no means the prerogative of humans. In fact, at all levels of 
biological organization organisms have evolved to solve coordination problems. 
They do so by signaling: transferring information to each other (Skyrms 2010, 
p. 6). Female baboons signal their fertility to male baboons with a red, swollen 
bottom. Bees signal the presence and location of food to other bees in the hive 
with an intricate dance. Even lifeforms as simple as bacteria have developed 
complex signaling systems (e.g. quorum sensing) to coordinate their behavior 
(e.g. to coordinate gene expression in the light of the density of the population).
These signaling systems evolve because they benefit both senders and 
 receivers. They create pathways of information that enable senders and receiv-
ers to coordinate their actions and increase their respective fitness (their chances 
of successful reproduction). Of course, sender and receivers must not be aware 
of the coordination they achieve, nor must they be consciously aware of the 
signal. Most non-human organisms are hard-wired to send and react on signals. 
Humans, on the other hand, are often aware of the signals they send and receive 
and  understand the coordination they achieve. A nod of the head lets our inter-
locutor know we understood him and that she can continue the story. A longer 
than usual affectionate look in the eyes of a potential partner lets that person 
know we’re romantically interested. And, of course, we constantly send linguistic 
signals to one another in order to coordinate our behavior. Whereas other species 
are limited in the signals they can send and interpret, we possess open-ended 
 communication systems (human languages) enabling us to coordinate in an 
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equally open-ended way. This endless repertoire of signals enables us to coor-
dinate in an inexhaustible number ways for an equally inexhaustible number of 
purposes. That makes human coordination unique.
3.2   Public Knowledge
When it comes to coordinating with others, we also have another trick up our 
sleeves. Contrary to other species, humans do not have to communicate with 
each other to achieve coordination. As pointed out above, we coordinate success-
fully with other drivers on crossroads not by waving hands or flashing headlights 
(i.e. sending signals) but by heeding traffic lights or observing priority rules. In 
this case, we rely on public knowledge. Something is public knowledge among 
a group of people, when everybody does not only know X (that would merely be 
“shared knowledge”), but when everybody also knows that everybody else in the 
group knows X.
Public knowledge enables successful coordination in the absence of direct 
communication. Going back to our example above, we coordinate our driving 
behavior successfully at crossroads by having public knowledge of traffic light 
rules. We go at green not merely because we know we are allowed to. We go at 
green because we expect the light to be red for oncoming drivers and know (or 
at least expect with a high degree of confidence) that these drivers also know the 
traffic light rules and will stop at the red light. In this scenario, public knowledge 
of traffic light rules enables drivers to coordinate successfully without communi-
cating with each other.
The rules of social contracts that solve coordination problems, do so by virtue 
of being public knowledge. Lewis (1969) refers to such rules as “conventions”: 
arbitrary rules that coordinate our behavior. They are arbitrary since participants 
could coordinate successfully in other ways (e.g. the rule to drive on the right 
side of the road is arbitrary since we could equally well all drive on the left side 
of the road). Such rules only need to be (publicly) known, they do not need to be 
enforced (at least not when we are dealing with pure coordination problems in 
which the interests of participants are fully aligned), since nobody would profit 
from breaking these rules (as long as they expect others to follow them). Even if 
the police would not punish driving on the “wrong” side of the road, (the vast 
majority of) people would not be tempted to do so, since they do not want to get 
into car accidents.
Lewis (1969) famously argued that the epistemic requirement for successful 
coordination on conventions is “common knowledge”. Common knowledge is 
“an infinite recursion of shared mental states, such that A knows X, A knows 
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that B knows X, A knows that B knows that A knows X, ad infinitum” (Thomas 
2015, p. iii). However, experimental evidence suggests that such a demanding 
epistemic requirement (an infinite recursion of shared mental states) is not nec-
essary for successful coordination. In an ingenious experiment, Devetag and 
colleagues (2013) actually found that second degree mutual knowledge (I know 
that you know and you know that I know) is sufficient for successful coordina-
tion. In a similar vein, Binmore (2008) has argued that common knowledge is 
not a necessary epistemic condition for successful coordination.
4   Solving Competition Problems
4.1   The Free-Rider Problem
Unlike coordination problems, competition problems are not merely epistemic 
problems. Getting information across or having common knowledge of a coordi-
nation solution does not suffice. The problem that needs to be dealt with is not 
only how we can coordinate our actions in order to cooperate but also: how we can 
prevent free-riding (“defecting”) from eroding cooperation. Given the payoff struc-
ture of competition problems, receivers have an incentive not to coordinate on the 
information received and senders have an incentive to send deceptive information.
Regarding the former, consider the following scenario. There is a water 
 shortage in the village and the council determines that all households should not 
exceed a daily ration of 100 l per day, otherwise the reserves will dwindle. I need 
150 l per day for normal consumption and irrigating my crops. We have a competi-
tion problem on our hand: a tragedy of the commons. I will benefit by exceeding 
my daily allowance in order to save my crop. Merely having the information (the 
ration) and being able to do my part in a coordinated effort for all of our long-term 
benefit (preventing a total drought), does not guarantee that I will do so.
Regarding the latter (sending deceptive signals), take an “honesty bar”. An 
unattended fridge is filled with beverages, a price list is tacked on the fridge and 
there’s a cash box in which customers are supposed to deposit the money for 
their consumption. The honesty bar is a cheap and efficient way to provide drinks 
(there’s no bartender on the payroll). The system benefits all customers since the 
price for the drinks is lower than it would be if there were a proper bar (the cost 
of which would reflect on the prices of the beverages). The honesty bar is located 
in a club and is only accessible to club members, all of whom promised to be 
honest. Nevertheless, members still have an incentive to cheat: retrospectively 
having sent a deceptive signal to abide by the rules.
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4.2   Costly Signaling
One often invoked way to ensure honest signaling is “costly signaling” (Zahavi 
1975, 1977; Nur and Hanson 1984; Grafen 1990; Roberts 1998; Smith and Bliege 
Bird 2000; Leimar and Hammerstein 2001; Gintis et al. 2001). The male peacock’s 
bright tail is a costly signal – it requires a lot of resources to keep it brightly 
colored – and therefore honest signal that the bird is fit and healthy. Only fit and 
healthy birds could forage enough to keep the tail brightly colored. Similarly, 
buying a love interest expensive gifts is a costly (and therefore honest) signal that 
one is wealthy and a good provider (it is honest since a poor person could not 
afford it and a bad provider would not want to).
In contexts where individuals could benefit from sending deceptive signals 
(i.e. in the context of competition problems), imposing costly signals is a way 
to prevent free-riding. Take religious communities. Typically, such communities 
offer support to their members in need by imposing altruistic obligations on their 
members (such as giving alms to the poor, taking care of the sick, etc.). They are 
therefore inherently vulnerable to free-riding (joining the community to reap the 
benefits of this religious altruism but not contributing anything oneself) (Ianna-
conne 1992). That is why, according to Iannacone (1992) and other scholars of 
religion (Irons 2001; Sosis 2003, 2006; Bulbulia and Sosis 2011), costly signals or 
“credibility enhancing displays” (Henrich 2009) of commitment to the religion 
(and the prosocial norms it imposes) are so rampant in many religious commu-
nities. Such costly signals range from fasting and pilgrimages to fire walking, 
 self-flagellation and even reenacted crucifixion. Their function is to keep free-
riders out. Professing one’s belief in a god is easily done, but walking on hot coals 
to prove one’s commitment not so much.
However, imposing such costly signals may work in religious communi-
ties where participants are highly motivated to show their commitment, but it 
does not always work for solving everyday competition problems. In order to 
be effective in keeping free-riders out, signals must be costly enough to com-
pletely offset the benefits of free-riding. Otherwise free-riders can still benefit 
by sending the costly signal in a dishonest way. The problem is that impos-
ing signals that are costly enough to prevent free-riding would also keep out 
potential cooperators since the payoff they get from mutual cooperation would 
equally be offset by the costly signal(s) they are required to send. Take the 
honesty bar example. We could install a locker on the fridge with a code that is 
only known to members having sent a signal costly enough to offset any benefit 
they could reap by free-riding. For example, they could be asked to donate a 
sum to the club that is substantial enough so that they could not make up for 
it by helping themselves to free drinks. However, that would defeat the whole 
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purpose of having cheap access to drinks. Nobody would want to pay the large 
sum to get access to the code.
What would work is a signal that is honest not in virtue of being costly but 
because it is hard – or even better, impossible – to fake. If I lift a barbell weighing 
200 kg, I honestly signal that I am strong. There is no faking it, a weak person 
could not lift it. Similarly, the springbok “stotting” or “pronking” – performing 
acrobatic leaps in the air – when stalked by a predator to signal that it is fit (and 
the predator should not bother chasing it), sends a “hard-to-fake” signal. A sick 
or old animal could not perform the leaps. The problem is that such hard-to-fake 
signals are not always available. A good deceiver may often fool us by deceptively 
sending us all the “right” signals that she is honest.
4.3   Punishment
Since signaling often comes short in solving competition problems, we need 
another mechanism. That mechanism is punishment. More particularly “proso-
cial” punishment in which individuals are punished for harming group interests, 
rather than being retaliated against by individuals who were harmed (Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2004). Prosocial punishment occurs in all human societies. In his 
famous list of human universals, Brown (1991) includes “sanctions for crimes 
against the collectivity”. While such sanctions have always existed in human 
societies in some form or other, they became much more prevalent since the 
Neolithic transition from homogenous, small-scale societies to larger and more 
complex societies. Whereas in the former cooperation is largely maintained by 
kinship ties – explained by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964) 
– and personal exchanges – explained by the mechanism of reciprocal altruism 
(Trivers 1971) – in the latter these mechanisms are powerless to maintain high 
levels of cooperation since many interactions now take place between strangers 
(Powers and Lehmann 2014; Powers et al. 2016).
Prosocial punishment ranges from subtle signs of disapproval displayed by 
group members, over being ridiculed or scolded to being fined, incarcerated, 
banished or killed as a last resort. It is a very effective way to protect group inter-
ests in those domains where free-rider problems surface. Both experimental 
studies (Ostrom et al. 1994; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Falk et al. 2005; Gürerk et al. 
2006; Fundenberg and Patak 2009; Chaudhury 2011) and field data (Ostrom 1990; 
Boehm et al. 1993; Henrich et al. 2006) show the effectiveness and the central role 
of punishment in solving competition problems. Going back to my honesty bar 
example, we could just install a camera and fine people (a sum exceeding the 
price of the stolen consumption) who fail to pay for their drink. No one would 
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benefit from cheating any longer (provided all cheaters are detected and fined). 
The competition problem would be solved: individual interests would no longer 
compete with group interests.
Given the central role of norms backed up by prosocial punishment in 
solving competition problems across human societies, it is surprising that they 
do not feature more prominently in Young’s, Sugden’s, Binmore’s and Skyrms’ 
naturalistic accounts of social structure. Two reasons, I believe, may explain this 
hiatus. The first is that the game-theoretic approach they adopt may lead them 
to implicitly assume that players in the various games of life are stuck with the 
payoff matrixes they are initially given (meaning that they cannot be changed 
by the players involved in these games). Secondly, as these authors are aware of, 
introducing prosocial punishment may not solve the free-rider problem after all 
because the act of punishing is costly to the punisher. So who is going to prevent 
the punisher from free-riding his obligation to punish? Any account invoking 
prosocial punishment to solve free-rider problems, must address this important 
challenge. In response, I will firstly argue that payoff matrixes of the games of life 
group members play with each other can and have indeed been changed by the 
participants. Then I will deal with the free-rider problem inherent to prosocial 
punishment.
4.4   Game Changers
Norms backed up by punishment solve competition problems by aligning individ-
ual interests with the interest of the group. They do so by imposing a cost on free-
riding. That cost consists of (the perception of the actors of) the negative payoff 
yielded by the punishment for committing the infraction, given (the perception 
of the actors of) the chance of actually being punished for the infraction. The cost 
hinged on the free-riding strategy serves to no longer incentivize individuals to 
adopt a free-riding strategy. When the expected payoff of free-riding is lower than 
the expected payoff of cooperating, the competition problem is solved. Individual 
interests no longer compete with group interests.
Of course the perception of the cost of free-riding and of the gains one could 
get out of it, varies from individual to individual. The same punishment can deter 
one person but not another. So implementing punishment will rarely prevent 
every body in the group from breaking the norm. However, in order to be effec-
tive, it should deter the vast majority of doing so. Throughout human history 
and across cultures, norms backed up by punishment have emerged to do just 
that. Take commons management. As Ostrom (1990) points out, in order to pre-
serve common-pool resources from depletion, the use of such resources must be 
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regulated and monitored and infractions must be punished. Such norm enforce-
ment can be found in all human societies [see Vlerick (2016) for an extensive 
account].
Note that the (endlessly) repeated prisoner’s dilemma is not a competition 
problem. Sugden (2005), Skyrms (2004) and Binmore (2005) rightly point out that 
cooperation can emerge and be maintained in such an iterated game (without 
changing the payoff matrix), because cooperators can retaliate against free-riders 
by refusing to cooperate with them in future rounds. In such an iterated game, it is 
in the interest of participants to cooperate as long as others do so. The iteration, as 
Skyrms (2004, p. 4) points out, turns the game into a stag hunt. Like the stag hunt, 
the game has two Nash equilibria: the cooperative and the uncooperative equi-
librium. In order to get to mutual cooperation, cooperators only need to identify 
and coordinate with other cooperators. Once cooperators interact with coopera-
tors, there is no more incentive for free-riding. The immediate benefit of free-rid-
ing would be quickly offset by the retaliation that would follow in the future. It is 
therefore very much a coordination problem, not a competition problem.
Many real life prisoner’s dilemma and common-pool resource problems, 
however, are not endlessly repeated. This is especially true in larger, more 
complex societies, in which many interactions between individuals are one-offs 
and anonymous. In those cases there is no “shadow of the future” (Trivers 1971; 
Axelrod 1984; Binmore 2005) looming over the participants and sanctions must 
be imposed in order to align individual interests with group interests. Unsurpris-
ingly, in this light, while prosocial punishments occur in all human societies, the 
extent to which they occur correlates with their size and complexity (Marlow and 
Berbesque 2008). However, invoking pro-social punishment to solve free-rider 
problems may not make the free-rider problem disappear. Punishing, it is often 
pointed out, is costly for the punisher. So what is to prevent punishers from free-
riding their obligation to punish?
4.5   The Cost of Punishment
Prosocial punishment is often referred to as “altruistic” punishment. It is deemed 
altruistic because the punisher incurs a personal cost, while the benefits are not 
reaped by the punisher in particular but by the whole community. The cost of 
punishment includes the time spent and the resources devoted to monitoring 
the behavior of others and punishing infractors as well as the personal risk one 
incurs when punishing someone who might lash back or take revenge later. Given 
that punishing is itself costly, the free-rider problem does not disappear by intro-
ducing prosocial punishment. It resurfaces on another level. The question now 
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becomes: how to inforce people to inforce the rules that prevent free-riding? Or 
as Binmore (2005, p. 85) puts it: “who guards the guardians”? Other guardians 
who would need to be guarded? We seem caught in an infinite regress. Proso-
cial punishment, nevertheless, is a prominent feature in societies (and doesn’t 
require second – let alone third or fourth order – norm enforcerment). How can 
we account for the emergence and maintenance of this core feature of social 
contracts?
The short answer is: prosocial punishment is typically not as altruistic as it 
may seem. According to Boehm (1997) and Bowles and Gintis (2011, p. 5), in small-
scale societies throughout human history – which were typically egalitarian – 
the possession of projectile weapons dramatically reduced the cost of punishing 
norm violators. Such projectile weapons enabled groups of people to collectively 
punish norm violators (e.g. by banishing or murdering them) at relatively low 
risk to each individual punisher. This, in effect, turns the cooperation problem 
of altruistic punishment from a competition problem into more of a coordina-
tion problem, i.e. the coordination of the act of collective punishment. This is 
also what Guala (2012, p. 9) points out. Ethnographic data suggests that prosocial 
punishment in small-scale societies typically is not (so) costly to the individual 
punishers, precisely because it takes the form of a coordinated punishment by a 
coalition against an individual. Moreover, as Boyd and colleagues (2003) point 
out, once punishing norm violators is done effectively in a society, norm violation 
becomes less frequent (people are deterred) and the cost of prosocial punishment 
decreases further (since there is less punishment to be handed out).
In large-scale societies on the other hand – according to Singh, Wrangham 
and Glowacki (2017) – the cost of enforcing group beneficial norms and the ben-
efits reaped by enforcing these norms often vary dramatically from individual 
to individual. The reason for this is that these societies typically morphed into 
highly hierarchical societies (Powers and Lehmann 2014). Powerful individu-
als within such societies have much to gain from norms yielding high levels of 
cooperation since they find themselves at the receiving end of these cooperative 
endeavors and they have the means to enforce these norms with relative ease 
given the power they wield. Prosocial punishment is in those cases typically not 
altruistic but self-serving, since the enforcers often have more to gain than they 
stand to lose by enforcing such norms.
Moreover, in large-scale societies prosocial punishment is typically heavily 
institutionalized and does not require the actual punishers to be altruistic. They are 
professional punishers who are incentivized to carry out their duty in order to keep 
their livelihood and are provided with the means (arms) to do so efficiently and at 
relatively low risk. Professional policing is by no means a modern phenomenon. 
Such law enforcers existed in the ancient Egyptian, Greek and Roman societies.
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Together with the burden on cognition to detect free-riders, the cost of 
 punishment may explain why solutions to competition problems have rarely 
evolved in non-human social species (as opposed to signaling systems solving 
coordination problems) (Raihany et al. 2012). Humans, in contrast, have stum-
bled on ways to (radically) reduce the cost of prosocial punishment and evolved 
the cognitive abilities to detect free-riding.4 This makes us very apt at solving 
competition problems. So much for how human groups (could) solve cooperation 
problems. The question remains why these solutions (social contracts) emerged. 
That is the subject of the next section.
5   The Emergence and Evolution of Social Contracts
Which cultural dynamics underlie the emergence, persistence and evolution 
of social contracts? In this section, I will argue that social contracts are the 
outcome of two cultural dynamics: “within-group” and “between-group” dynam-
ics [see also Vlerick (2020) where I apply these cultural dynamics to the cultural 
 evolution of institutional religions]. Within-group dynamics refer to the interac-
tion between individuals in the group, between-group dynamics to the interac-
tion between groups.
5.1   Within-Group Dynamics
The focus of current game-theoretic accounts of social contracts is on these kinds 
of dynamics (Binmore 1994, 1998, 2005, 2007; Skyrms 1996, 2004; Young 1998; 
Sugden’s 2005). Within-group dynamics refer to the dynamic interplay of indi-
vidual strategies of group members. They drive the outcome of the games of life 
we play with each other to stable points: Nash equilibria (in which everybody has 
a best response to whatever everybody else is doing). If the strategies of all par-
ticipants do not hold each other in equilibrium (if everybody does not have a best 
response to what everybody else is doing), some participants can be expected to 
change their strategy and the outcome of the social interaction will be upset until 
it reaches an (Nash) equilibrium.
4 According to Cosmides and Tooby (1992) we are endowed with a specialized cognitive module 
to do so: a “cheater detection module”, and language enables us to exchange information regard-
ing the trustworthiness of others in the group (Dunbar 1998).
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Social contracts – sets of commonly known rules that govern the  interaction 
of group members – occupy such equilibria. They don’t need any glue, as 
Binmore (2005, p. 4) points out. They do not require anyone to sacrifice his 
or her  self-interest for the benefit of the group.5 If this were not the case, people 
would (often) not adhere to the rules making up social contracts and the social 
contract would fall into desuetude. This is the central and important point of 
game-theoretic accounts of the emergence and evolution of social contracts.
Not all equilibria are equally likely to be occupied by social contracts, 
however. On the one hand, between-group dynamics (as I will explain in the 
next section) select efficient equilibria over less efficient equilibria. On the other 
hand, within-group dynamics often select psychologically salient equilibria. 
This is an important point made by Schelling (1960) and Lewis (1969). Psycho-
logically more salient coordination solutions (equilibria in coordination games) 
are more likely to emerge than less salient solutions.
Take the driving game. The two salient coordination solutions are to all drive 
on the left or to all drive on the right. There are however an infinite number of 
other (and equally effective) coordination solutions. We could decide to drive 
on the left on uneven days of the month and on the right on even days, or left 
on week days and right in weekends, or left between 8 am and 8 pm and right 
between 8 pm and 8 am, etc. All these rules are proper equilibria6 – nobody has 
an incentive to deviate from these rules if everybody else follows them. However, 
they are unnecessarily complicated. It should not surprise us that all countries 
coordinate on one of the two most salient solutions of the driving game.
Within-group dynamics explain why (salient) coordination rules emerge. 
When it comes to solving competition problems, however, between-group dynamics 
play a major role. They select game changing norms (norms that affect the payoff 
related to the available strategies through punishment or reward to solve free-rider 
problems) which create better equilibria than the ones originally available.
5.2   Between-Group Dynamics
Social contracts are not only shaped by the interaction of individuals within the 
group (each coming up with a best response to what the others are doing), they 
5 Note that when social contracts solve competition problems by imposing norms with sanc-
tions, they do not require self-sacrifice. They change the payoff matrix so as to get self-interested 
strategies in line with group interests.
6 In fact they are what Aumann (1974) calls “correlated equilibria” in which all participants 
 determine their strategy by following a public signal (such as date or time of the day in the ex-
amples above).
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are also shaped by the interaction between groups. Whereas the former move 
the game to (salient) equilibria, the latter select efficient equilibria.7 As Binmore 
(2005, p. 5) puts it: “a social contract must be internally stable, or it would not 
survive. It needs to be efficient or it would not compete with the social contracts 
of other societies.” In other words, if a social contract is not stable, it will be dis-
mantled by within-group dynamics. If it is not efficient (i.e. yielding a large payoff 
for group members), it will be dismantled by between-group dynamics.
Competition between groups selects for norms (and punishments) that 
enable cooperation in the context of competition problems (Aviles 2002; Boyd 
et al. 2003; West et al. 2007; Puurtinen and Mappes 2009).8 The selective pressure 
arising from group competition is what Boyd, Richerson, Henrich and others refer 
to as “cultural group selection” (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Richerson and Boyd 
1999; Boyd and Richerson 2002; Henrich 2004; Richerson et al. 2016). Cultural 
entities (such as technology, knowledge and – in the context of this paper – social 
contracts) that provide the group with an advantage over other groups are likely 
to spread (i.e. they are likely to be culturally selected).
Several important factors underlie the cultural selection of group ben-
eficial social contracts. Conflict between groups, competition between groups 
over scarce resources, demographic expansion of successful groups, migra-
tion to successful groups and imitation of successful groups all result in the 
spread of group beneficial norms and customs (Bowles and Gintis 2011, p. 50). 
How does that work? Very briefly (and grossly oversimplifying), in a direct con-
flict between groups, groups that cooperate well often have a (military) edge 
over groups that do not cooperate as well. The former groups end up winning 
conflicts against the latter, who vanish or are absorbed in the more coopera-
tive group (and brought under their social contract). The same logic applies to 
7 Although, as Singh et al. (2017) rightly argue, within-group dynamics can also lead to group 
beneficial equilibria. This is the case when the interests of powerful individuals (who are able 
to enforce the individually costly norms that lead to such equilibria) are aligned with the inter-
ests of the group. In that case, we do not need to invoke between group dynamics to explain 
the emergence of group beneficial norms, merely the strategic actions of individuals aimed at 
maximizing their personal payoff.
8 This does not mean that mutual cooperation in competition problems is produced or sus-
tained by competition between groups. As pointed out in the previous section, it is typically 
sustained by prosocial punishment. It means that in a context of group competition, groups 
with high levels of cooperation will often outcompete groups with lower levels of cooperation 
and consequently the social contracts enabling these high levels of cooperation will thrive 
(more on this below).
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competition for scarce resources between groups: the more cooperative groups 
have an advantage over less cooperative groups who find themselves at the 
losing end of the competitive interaction and ultimately vanish (while the coop-
erative groups thrive and expand). Furthermore, since efficient social contracts 
yield a higher (average) payoff to the individuals within the group, such groups 
have expanded historically. They did so for two reasons: firstly, more resources 
translated in greater reproductive output – more mouths could be fed (today 
this trend is reversed – that is known as the “economic demographic paradox”). 
Secondly, members of less successful groups migrated to more successful (read 
wealthier) groups (this trend holds true today – more than ever in fact because 
of increased mobility – see Collier 2013). Finally, efficient social contracts do 
not only spread because groups possessing them outcompete groups not pos-
sessing them. They also spread because they are being copied by other groups. 
Less successful groups imitate more successful groups, taking over some of 
their customs, innovations and social contracts (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 
2002; Henrich 2004).9
5.3   Gene-Culture Co-Evolution
Interestingly, between-group dynamics have not only shaped human cultures, 
but indirectly also human nature. They had an (important) impact on human 
genetic evolution. In particular, they have shaped our genetically wired social 
psychology. That is known as “gene-culture co-evolution” (Boyd and Richerson 
1985; Henrich 2004; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Gintis 2011).
In short (and again grossly oversimplifying), social contracts punishing 
free-riding and other asocial behavior create an environment in which individu-
als who are genetically predisposed to such behavior have a reproductive disad-
vantage (read they are often banished or killed and prevented from spreading 
9 The cultural group selection hypothesis advanced by Boyd, Richerson and Henrich is in-
fluential but not without its critics. Some see it as a repackaged version of old and debunked 
(biological) group selection arguments (e.g. Pinker 2012). Others question the assumption that 
group conflict was pervasive throughout human history. As Sterelny (2016) (who nevertheless 
concludes that cultural group selection may well have been a major factor in the transition to 
large-scale, hierarchical societies in the Holocene) points out: ethnographic evidence by itself 
does not establish that conflict between groups was as prevalent as is often assumed. However, 
as explained above, direct conflict between groups is but one of the mechanisms producing 
 cultural group selection.
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their sociopathic genes) compared to individuals endowed with a more prosocial 
nature. This, as Henrich (2010) points out, led to “the self-domestication” of our 
species: we became increasingly more altruistic (towards group members) and 
prone to follow social norms. In turn, this reflected on the social contracts in the 
groups of our ancestors. Those contracts imposed increasingly more altruistic 
behavior on its member (and severe punishments on defectors), which again 
sharpened the genetic selective pressure on altruistic, prosocial, norm-abiding 
individuals, etc.
One important consequence of this is that human beings will often cooper-
ate in competition situations (and so forsake the higher payoff they would get 
out of free-riding) in the total absence of sanctions (social, economic or other). 
As Bicchieri (2005, p. x) points out, humans often act prosocially even if they 
are not coerced to do so. (That is why honesty bars without cameras work). This 
is clearly shown by behavioral game-theoretic experiments (dictator games) in 
which people regularly divide a sum fairly even if they could have kept every-
thing for themselves without any negative consequence (Camerer and Thaler 
1995). The acute sense of fairness that prompts people to act altruistically seems 
to an important extent innate. Young children, who could not have acquired this 
sense of fairness culturally, already exhibit it (Warneken and Tomasello 2009). It 
evolved in response to social environments characterized by increasingly severe 
prosocial norms and makes Homo sapiens, as Bowles and Gintis (2011) have put 
it, a remarkably “cooperative species”.
6   Conclusion
Social contracts emerged, persisted and evolved in response to the various coop-
eration problems humans have faced throughout history. Cooperation problems 
comprise both coordination and competition problems. The former are solved by 
creating common knowledge of coordination rules within the group. These solu-
tions emerge from within-group dynamics. The latter are solved by norms that 
punish free-riding and doing so align individual interests with the group interest. 
They are largely (but not exclusively) culturally selected as a result of between-
group competition. Current naturalistic accounts of the emergence and evolution 
of social contracts have focused mainly on how within-group dynamics lead to 
solutions to coordination problems. A more complete picture emerges when we 
view social contracts as solutions to cooperation problems – not merely coordi-
nation problems – and include between-group dynamics that select solutions to 
competition problems.
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